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The reform and development of state-owned enterprises（SOEs）plays an 
important role in China’s economic institutional reform. To do it well, the key 
issue is to improve the incentive and restraint institutions of SOEs executives. In 
the various ways to incent and restrain the executives, the core and most obvious 
and sensitive one is the payment distribution. Nowadays, the annual pay 
institution is prevailing in the distributional reform of China’s SOEs. 
On the basis of the analytical methods of management and economy 
theories as well as the successful experience to incent executives home and 
abroad, this thesis discusses the way to design and improve the annual pay 
institution in SOEs in order to stimulate the performance of executives. It is 
composed of five chapters. 
The first chapter offers specific definitions of the executives and annual 
pay institution, and detailed explanations about the theoretical and practical 
value of the research. The researching methods and steps are also stated at the 
end of this chapter. 
The second chapter reviews the research outcomes on designing executive 
payment incentive in theories of management incentive, distribution according 
to work, human capital property and principal agent. Based on these outcomes, 
this chapter discusses the factors which influence the annual payment of 
executives from the perspectives both inside and outside the enterprises, and at 
the same time analyzes the function of these factors. 
The third chapter first compares and contrasts the actual situations of 
annual pay institution of executives home and abroad; then reviews the 
development of China’s annual pay institution systematically; and finally puts 
forward some personal views about the present situation and problems existed in 
its implementation in China. 
The fourth chapter proposes the basic principle, general idea and specific 













condition of the SOEs in the economic institutional reform. Meanwhile, it makes 
an in-depth comparison and analysis on several popular annual pay institutions 
in China.  
The last chapter analyzes and comments on the annual pay institution of 
Xiamen State-owned Property Investing Corporation, on the basis of the above 
researching outcomes and the field questionnaire survey. Suggestions to 
improve it are also offered. 
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第一章  导 论 
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企业试行年薪制，调动了国有企业经营者的积极性；2003 年 11 月 25 日国
务院国有资产监督管理委员会正式颁布《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂
行办法》，并于 2004 年 1 月 1 日起施行。2004 年福建省国有资产监督管理
委员会也颁布了《福建省国资委履行出资人职责企业负责人薪酬管理意见
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